The Growing Monopoly in the Corn Seed Industry: Is It Time for the Government to Interfere? by Sumpter, Bethany K
Texas A&M Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 3 
4-30-2021 
The Growing Monopoly in the Corn Seed Industry: Is It Time for 
the Government to Interfere? 
Bethany K Sumpter 
Texas A&M University School of Law (Student), bsumpter@tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Agriculture Commons, Agriculture Law Commons, Antitrust and Trade Regulation 
Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bethany K Sumpter, The Growing Monopoly in the Corn Seed Industry: Is It Time for the Government to 
Interfere?, 8 Tex. A&M L. Rev. 633 (2021). 
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/LR.V8.I3.6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Texas A&M Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more information, 
please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 1 28-APR-21 10:51
THE GROWING MONOPOLY IN THE CORN




How a company conducts business is often a consumer concern. Individu-
als have accused company after company of monopolistic behavior. These
individuals have also criticized the Department of Justice for not stopping a
monopoly from forming in a specific industry. An example is the corn seed
industry, where stakeholders have accused companies of monopolistic behav-
ior. Recent mergers and acquisitions in the corn seed industry have left fewer
companies in control, and because of this consolidation, individuals are urg-
ing the government to act. This Comment argues that, while the corn seed
industry is on the road to containing a monopoly, the industry does not yet
contain enough characteristics to warrant a government response. However,
when a monopoly does form, the government should, and likely will, act.
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I. INTRODUCTION
  Farmers, industry experts, agricultural organizations, and politicians
are concerned about the corn seed industry’s recent mergers.1 The six
most prominent companies in the seed industry, Bayer, DuPont, Mon-
santo, BASF, Syngenta, and Dow, have consolidated into four compa-
nies, Bayer, DowDuPont, ChemChina, and BASF.2 A 2018 U.S.
House bill reflects congressional concern with industry consolidation,
pricing, and profitability:
In the United States, the [four] largest corn seed sellers accounted
for 85[%] of the market in 2015, up from 60[%] in 2000. Over the
past [twenty] years, the cost for an acre’s worth of seeds for an aver-
age corn farmer has nearly quadrupled, and the cost of fertilizer has
more than doubled. Yet corn yields increased only 36[%] over that
time, and the price received for the sale of a bushel of corn in-
creased only 31[%].3
Farm-industry stakeholders worry that these consolidations will nega-
tively impact the corn seed industry.4 Organizations supporting farm-
ers, including the American Farm Bureau5 and Farm Aid,6 have
1. Kristina Hubbard, The Sobering Details Behind the Latest Seed Monopoly
Chart, CIV. EATS (Jan. 11, 2019), https://civileats.com/2019/01/11/the-sobering-details-
behind-the-latest-seed-monopoly-chart/ [https://perma.cc/8MXJ-C5AR]; Farmers
Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, FARM AID (Mar. 8, 2018), https://
www.farmaid.org/issues/corporate-power/farmers-overwhelmingly-oppose-bayer-
monsanto-merger/ [https://perma.cc/7SJU-ZC3X]; Food and Agribusiness Merger
Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2018, H.R. 6800, 115th Cong. (2018).
2. Hubbard, supra note 1.
3. H.R. 6800 § 2(7).
4. See id. § 2; Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra
note 1.
5. The American Farm Bureau is a group of “farm and ranch families working
together to build a sustainable future of safe and abundant food, fiber and renewable
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vocally opposed the industry’s mergers.7 Industry expert Philip How-
ard8 noted that even though the firms attempting to merge promised
greater job growth prospects and innovation, Bayer recently elimi-
nated 12,000 jobs, which equals roughly 10% of its workforce.9 How-
ard also worries that farmers’ choices regarding seeds are decreasing
due to industry consolidation.10
Politicians, organizations, and industry experts are not alone in wor-
rying about industry consolidation, as farmers have also expressed
concern.11 Over 93% of farmers believe that the recent Bayer-Mon-
santo merger will adversely affect independent farmers and their com-
munities.12 They fear that Bayer’s sheer power will make people want
to buy products from the company and that Bayer will control indus-
try data and pressure farmers into using chemical products.13 The re-
cently merged company may shield farm data, raise prices, and reduce
the quality and quantity of seed varieties, such as climate-adaptive
seeds.14 Nebraska farmer Clay Govier stated, “From my perspective,
[Monsanto-Bayer is] saying the exact opposite of what most people in
the industry actually believe.”15
The concern about mergers has led to criticism of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice (“DOJ”) for “weak antitrust law enforcement and
oversight” that has “allowed a handful of firms to amass enormous
market, economic, and political power over our global seed supply.”16
In other words, farmers, organizations, and industry experts believe
fuel for our nation and the world.” About, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, https://
www.fb.org/about/overview [https://perma.cc/7SUB-L28Y].
6. “Farm Aid is a nonprofit organization whose mission is to keep family farmers
on the land.” About Us, FARM AID, https://www.farmaid.org/about-us/ [https://
perma.cc/3NT7-ATD5].
7. Statement by Bob Young, Chief Economist, American Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, Regarding Bayer-Monsanto Merger, WIS. FARM BUREAU FED’N (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://wfbf.com/ag-newswire/statement-by-bob-young-chief-economist-american-
farm-bureau-federation-regarding-bayer-monsanto-merger/ [https://perma.cc/K5PF-
ASB4]; American Farm Bureau Urges Caution on Ag Mergers, WIS. STATE FARMER
(Sept. 20, 2016, 1:02 PM), https://www.wisfarmer.com/story/opinion/2016/09/20/ameri
can-farm-bureau-urges-caution-ag-mergers/90741030/ [https://perma.cc/QR48-JLEK];
Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1.
8. Philip Howard is a professor at Michigan State University, with his research
focusing on the food system. About/CV, PHILIP H. HOWARD, https://philhoward.net/
about/ [https://perma.cc/73FU-P85Q].
9. Hubbard, supra note 1.
10. Id.




15. Dana Varinsky, The $66 Billion Bayer-Monsanto Merger Just Got a Major




16. Hubbard, supra note 1.
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that a monopoly is forming in the corn seed industry.17 Because these
individuals are calling for the enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws,
which illegalize monopolies, a careful review of the corn seed industry
is warranted to determine if a monopoly exists.
A monopoly is “[a] type of commercial advantage enjoyed by one
business entity that lets it determine to a significant extent the terms
on which products or services may be obtained in a given region.”18
Monopolies were not always illegal in the United States.19 Originally,
antitrust regulation responded to the formation of trusts, “a legal de-
vice used to coordinate multiple property owners through a unified
management structure.”20 Trusts led to significant industry consolida-
tion, which prompted the government, at both the state and federal
level, to pass antitrust regulations to counterbalance the lack of indus-
try competition.21 Beginning in the 1880s, innovative agricultural and
industrial technology facilitated corporate mergers and undercut
smaller businesses.22 Antitrust law changes have historically followed
economic and political changes, and the U.S. antitrust laws will likely
continue responding accordingly.23
Some analysts support relaxed enforcement of antitrust laws and
argue that the government should minimally regulate industries to al-
low the free market to work.24 For example, economic experts25 be-
lieve “a truly free market, one unencumbered by concentrated power
and wealth, could reinvigorate our democracy.”26 Others believe that
increased regulation is necessary for an industry’s success.27 These
17. Id.; Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1.
18. Monopoly, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/monopoly
[https://perma.cc/4F92-55QR].
19. See Laura Phillips Sawyer, US Antitrust Law and Policy in Historical Perspec-
tive 2 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 19-110, 2019); The Antitrust Laws, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-anti
trust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/A47W-JPSP].
20. Sawyer, supra note 19, at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 3.
24. Becky Beaupre Gillespie, The Radical Benefits of a Truly Free Market, U. CHI.
L. SCH. (June 11, 2018), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/radical-markets [https://
perma.cc/DYL5-W6P7].
25. Two economic experts who advocate for a free market are Eric Posner and
Glen Weyl. Posner is a Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law at
the University of Chicago Law School. He researches financial regulation, interna-
tional law, and constitutional law. Eric A. Posner, U. CHI. L. SCH., https://
www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e [https://perma.cc/J8A5-D9Z2]. Weyl “use[s]
ideas from [the] political economy to develop social technology for widely-shared
prosperity and diverse cooperation.” Biography, GLEN WEYL, http://glenweyl.com/bi
ography/ [https://perma.cc/J96C-MUFH].
26. Gillespie, supra note 24.
27. Gerald Houseman, Joseph Stiglitz and the Critique of Free Market Analysis,
CHALLENGE, Mar.–Apr. 2006, at 52, 59, https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstig
litz/sites/jstiglitz/files/2006_Challenge.pdf [https://perma.cc/M58J-437F].
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pro-regulation individuals often “associate [free enterprise] with
price-fixing, the Enron Corporation, environmental threats, consumer
fraud, union-busting, antitrust violations, deregulation, rationaliza-
tions for layoffs and for budget cuts in social welfare programs, priva-
tization schemes, speculation, stock manipulation, chicanery, and
corruption.”28 Antitrust laws are just one solution supported by free-
market critics.29
Politicians, farmers, farm organizations, and industry experts argue
that the government must step in and regulate the corn seed industry,
specifically by enforcing U.S. antitrust laws.30 However, it is not time
for the government to execute these antitrust laws. This Comment ar-
gues that there is no monopoly in the corn seed industry today, but
certain factors indicate there will likely be one in the future. Because
corn is a crucial crop, eventually the government must, and likely will,
prevent a monopoly from forming in this industry.31 Part II explains
the corn industry’s history and corn’s importance in today’s market
and economy. Part III defines a monopoly, discusses how courts iden-
tify one, and then argues that a monopoly does not exist in the corn
seed industry today. Part IV discusses the monopoly that is starting to
form and its underlying causes. Finally, Part V explores efforts to
prompt industry regulation and how the government is likely to regu-
late the monopoly when it forms.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CORN
To appreciate why farmers, industry experts, farm organizations,
and politicians closely watch the government’s regulation of the corn
seed industry, one must consider the industry’s history and growth,
and its importance today.
28. Id. at 53.
29. See id.; see also Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-con
duct/monopolization-defined [https://perma.cc/PUK3-XNLJ].
30. Hubbard, supra note 1; Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto
Merger, supra note 1.
31. See Laura Neff, Types of Corn, NATIVE SEEDS/SEARCH (June 12, 2018),
https://www.nativeseeds.org/blogs/blog-news/types-of-corn [https://perma.cc/Z95U-
LN7H]; see also JORGE FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. INFO.
BULL. NO. 786, THE SEED INDUSTRY IN U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN EXPLORATION OF
DATA AND INFORMATION ON CROP SEED MARKETS, REGULATION, INDUSTRY STRUC-
TURE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
webdocs/publications/42517/13616_aib786_1_.pdf?v=6048 [https://perma.cc/92KY-
8DBJ].
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A. The Corn Industry Throughout History
The corn industry has an extensive and robust history.32 Corn do-
mestication occurred between 7,000 and 10,000 years ago in Mexico.33
Trade networks across North and South America allowed corn to
spread beyond Mexico.34 Thus, when Europeans came to the Ameri-
cas in 1492, about 300 different types of corn existed.35
Methods for growing and planting corn have undoubtedly changed
throughout the years.36 In the late 1800s, most people grew open-pol-
linated varieties,37 which “are seeds that result from pollination by in-
sects, wind, self-pollination . . . or other natural forms of
pollination.”38 By the early 1900s, however, hybrid corn’s popularity
increased,39 largely due to the work of Henry A. Wallace.40 Hybrid
corn results “when a breeder selects two pure lines . . . and cross-
pollinates them to produce a seed that combines desirable characteris-
tics or ‘traits’ from both parents.”41 By 1965, 95% of U.S. corn was
hybrid corn.42
The 1980s saw growth in biotechnology43 after the United States
Supreme Court implied that a genetically modified seed could receive
patent protection.44 In the 1990s, patents caused mergers and acquisi-
tions to become popular in the industry, as patents afforded “intellec-
tual property protection to seeds,” which “encouraged firms to put
more money into research and development,” but to achieve that,
firms “often had to get bigger through mergers.”45
32. See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 25–28; see generally Jon Derek
Pruitt, A Brief History of Corn: Looking Back to Move Forward, U. NEB.-LINCOLN,
May 6, 2016, at 1, 2, https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&
context=PLanthealthdoc [https://perma.cc/Y4RX-BCBY].
33. Pruitt, supra note 32, at 2.
34. Id. at 4.
35. Id.
36. FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 25.
37. Id.
38. Seed Buying 101: A Seed Gardener’s Glossary, HOME GARDEN SEED ASS’N,
https://ucanr.edu/sites/ucmg2014conference/files/200053.pdf [https://perma.cc/SNZ6-
YSF9].
39. See FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 25.
40. It has been stated that Henry Wallace’s “continual, persuasive editorial sup-
port in Wallaces’ Farmer for this new kind of corn undoubtedly had a major effect on
corn belt farmers and helped speed the adoption of hybrids in Iowa and adjoining
midwestern states.” William L. Brown, H. A. Wallace and the Development of Hybrid
Corn, 47 THE ANNALS OF IOWA 167, 167 (1983).
41. Seed Buying 101: A Seed Gardener’s Glossary, supra note 38.
42. FERNANDEZ-CORNEJO, supra note 31, at 25.
43. Id. at 26.
44. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1980); Gil Gullickson,
What Farmers Can Expect from the Latest Round of Seed Company Mergers, SUC-
CESSFUL FARMING (June 27, 2019), https://www.agriculture.com/crops/corn/what-
farmers-can-expect-from-the-latest-round-of-seed-company-mergers/ [https://
perma.cc/GP5E-E3BM].
45. Gullickson, supra note 44.
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The chart below shows that the corn industry’s value boomed in
2000 and has since remained valuable.46 For example, in 2019, the
corn industry was worth about $52.7 billion.47 U.S. farmers planted
around 89.7 million acres of corn, harvested around 81.5 million acres,
and sold 13.7 billion bushels for an average price of $3.85 per bushel.48
U.S. CORN CROP VALUE
(1939–2019)
B. The Uses of Corn
Corn and its various types are relevant in the lives of many individ-
uals today, whether one uses it for nutritional, cultural, or other prac-
tical purposes.49 Thus, everyone in the world likely has a connection
to corn in one way or another.50
46. See U.S. Corn Crop Value: 1939 – 2019, NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, http://
www.worldofcorn.com/#us-corn-crop-value [https://perma.cc/692H-UD75].
47. U.S. Corn at a Glance 2019, NAT’L CORN GROWERS ASS’N, http://
www.worldofcorn.com/#us-corn-at-a-glance [https://perma.cc/M4KZ-YTHA].
48. Id.
49. See Neff, supra note 31.
50. See id.; Brent Gloy, Trends in Corn Consumption, AGRIC. ECON. INSIGHTS
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://aei.ag/2017/02/27/trends-corn-consumption/ [https://perma.cc/
LNQ9-M3WR].
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The different corn types include popcorn, flint, flour, dent, and
sweet, producing more than 3,500 corn uses.51 Three out of four super-
market products contain corn, resulting in the average American
spending about $267 yearly on products that contain corn.52 Corn’s
culinary uses include popcorn, grits, polenta, pinole, cornmeal,
hominy, atole, bread, tamales, tortillas, posole, chicos, parched corn,
elotes, corn beer, sugar, whiskey, and animal feed.53 Non-culinary uses
include penicillin, starch, ethanol, cornsilk, oil, and glue.54
Corn’s impact is also cultural.55 For example, the Cornhusker is the
University of Nebraska’s mascot.56 The Seneca Foods water tower in
Minnesota displays an ear of corn.57 South Dakota’s Corn Palace at-
tracts hundreds of thousands of tourists per year.58 Finally, families
explore corn mazes annually during fall festivities.59 These symbols
and activities indicate corn’s cultural reach.60
In short, corn’s expansive reach underscores the importance of de-
termining if a monopoly exists in the industry.
III. DETERMINING IF A MONOPOLY EXISTS
The U.S. legal framework establishes a two-prong test for analyzing
an industry for monopolistic characteristics.61 This test is a touchstone
for analyzing whether a monopoly exists in the corn seed industry
today.
A. Laws Governing Monopolies
Throughout U.S. history, Congress has passed three major antitrust
laws: the Sherman Act,62 the Federal Trade Commission Act,63 and
the Clayton Act.64 The three antitrust laws generally aim “to protect
the process of competition for the benefit of consumers, making sure
51. Rob Wile, 11 Wild Facts About Corn in America, BUS. INSIDER (July 18, 2012,
10:45 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facts-about-the-corn-industry-2012-7
[https://perma.cc/NBT9-883B]; Neff, supra note 31.
52. Wile, supra note 51.
53. Neff, supra note 31; Miss Cellania, 10 Ways We Use Corn, MENTAL FLOSS
(Oct. 9, 2010), http://mentalfloss.com/article/26030/10-ways-we-use-corn [https://
perma.cc/A8GD-Z6LD].
54. Cellania, supra note 53.






61. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
62. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 657, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7).
63. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
64. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
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there are strong incentives for businesses to operate efficiently, keep
prices down, and keep quality up.”65
The 1890 Sherman Act is a “comprehensive charter of economic
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule
of trade.”66 The Sherman Act outlaws the unreasonable restraint of
trade, including “arrangements among competing individuals or busi-
nesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids.”67 It also outlaws mo-
nopolization, whether it is an attempt, conspiracy, or combination.68
The DOJ prosecutes violators, who face civil and criminal liability.69
Congress passed the 1914 Federal Trade Commission Act70 to out-
law unfair competition methods and deceptive practices.71 The United
States Supreme Court ruled in FTC v. Cement Institute that if some-
one violates the Sherman Act, the individual may also violate the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act.72
The last primary antitrust law, the 1914 Clayton Act,73 reflects a
congressional attempt to address problems that the Sherman Act did
not.74 For example, the Clayton Act outlaws mergers and acquisitions
that may significantly reduce competition or promote monopoly for-
mation.75 The Robinson-Patman Act later amended the Clayton Act
to target discriminatory business activities relating to prices and
services.76
B. Finding a Monopoly in an Industry
Under U.S. antitrust laws, a monopoly exists in an industry when a
firm has “significant and durable market power.”77 A business may
not unreasonably restrict competition by forming a monopoly.78
Claims under the antitrust laws primarily relate to monopoly power
gained through maintaining a significant portion of the industry’s mar-





70. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
71. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 19.
72. See id.; FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948).
73. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
74. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 19.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29; see also Richter Concrete Corp. v.
Hilltop Concrete Corp., 691 F.2d 818, 826–27 (6th Cir. 1982); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden
Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1232 (8th Cir. 1987).
78. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29; see also United States v. N.Y. Great
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626, 636 (E.D. Ill. 1946), aff’d, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir.
1949); Amphastar Pharms., Inc. v. Momenta Pharms., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 222,
227–28 (D. Mass. 2018).
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ket share.79 However, the laws also prevent companies from attempt-
ing or conspiring to create a monopoly.80 When determining if a
company has violated the antitrust laws, courts use a two-prong test,
discussed in detail below.81
1. The Two-Prong Test
After a court determines the relevant industry and the companies in
that industry,82 the court will then move on to the two-prong test.83
For the first prong, the court determines if the business has a leading
position in the market.84 If so, the court moves to the second prong to
analyze whether the business improperly obtained that market
power.85 The court considers how that business’s monopoly affects in-
dustry competition and whether the business can offer any pro-com-
petitive rationale for its conduct.86
a. Prong One
The first prong focuses on a company’s monopoly power in the re-
spective industry.87 A company need not have a literal monopoly
(where the firm has complete market control) to have monopoly
power in an industry.88 Courts instead target companies that have
enough power to eliminate competitors or raise market prices.89 Thus,
courts consider the company’s market share.90 In general, monopoly
power exists when the company’s market share exceeds 50%.91 For
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit de-
termined that Microsoft had monopoly power when its products “ac-
count[ed] for a greater than 95% share” of the relevant market.92
Beyond market share, the company’s “leading position must be sus-
tainable over time: if competitive forces or the entry of new firms
could discipline the conduct of the leading firm, courts are unlikely to
find that the firm has lasting market power.”93
79. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
80. Id.
81. See id.; United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).




86. Id.; see also Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570–71.





92. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
93. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
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A company can obtain market power in many ways,94 including
through mergers and acquisitions, which are popular because of their
profitability.95 Despite an increase in earnings for the merging compa-
nies, mergers and acquisitions are not always good for the industry as
a whole.96 After two companies merge, the newly created company
naturally has more resources than either of the two could alone.97 This
increase in resources often allows the company to lower its prices and
attract customers away from smaller businesses, making some smaller
businesses suffer.98
Patents are another popular way a company can obtain monopoly
power in an industry.99 Patents give inventors the exclusive right to
their invention for a set time period.100 Patents often create a monop-
oly because the patentee gains sole control of its work.101 “This is the
very essence of a monopoly: being [the] sole supplier of some
good[.]”102
Other factors contributing to monopoly power include copyrights,
zoning laws, licensing limits, insufficient supplies, and capital costs.103
Therefore, if a company obtains monopoly power by gaining 50% of
the market share in the industry through one of the many avenues
discussed above, the court will move to prong two of the analysis.104
94. See Mergers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competi-
tion-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers [https://perma.cc/37YW-6V22]; Copyright
Is a Monopoly! (and Isn’t like Normal Property), RUFUS POLLOCK (Jan. 31, 2011),
https://rufuspollock.com/2011/01/31/copyright-is-a-monopoly-and-isnt-like-normal-
property/ [https://perma.cc/2WM3-ZFEB] [hereinafter Copyright Is a Monopoly!].
95. See Mergers, supra note 94; Ahmed Modu Kumshe et al., Effects of Mergers
and Acquisitions on Profitability and Earnings Per Share of Selected Deposit Money
Banks in Nigeria, 7 EUR. J. BUS. & MGMT. 97, 104 (2015), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.734.6909&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/PT94-
ZWHM] (discussing a 2015 study showing that when two struggling banks merged,
their profits increased).
96. Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Mergers May Be Profitable, but Are
They Good for the Economy?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 15, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/
11/mergers-may-be-profitable-but-are-they-good-for-the-economy [https://perma.cc/
H3YA-ZS9D].




99. See Entry and Efficiencies, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-ad-
vice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/mergers/entry-efficiencies [https://
perma.cc/NK8C-WAHT].
100. Will Kenton, Patent, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
patent.asp [https://perma.cc/NEL5-KMCJ].
101. See Copyright Is a Monopoly!, supra note 94.
102. Id.
103. Entry and Efficiencies, supra note 99.
104. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
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b. Prong Two
The second prong analyzes whether the company used unfair prac-
tices to obtain monopoly power in the industry.105 Courts determine
the means used to obtain monopoly power,106 focusing on companies
that obtained their power through “exclusionary or predatory acts,”
which include using “exclusive supply or purchase agreements; tying;
predatory pricing; or refusal to deal.”107
The first type of improper conduct involves exclusive supply or
purchase agreements.108 Exclusive supply agreements restrict suppli-
ers from marketing toward other buyers, while exclusive purchase
agreements compel dealers to only sell products from one manufac-
turer.109 Exclusive agreements are a concern because they may pre-
vent new firms from entering the market. Additionally, these
agreements inhibit existing firms’ growth because they limit the num-
ber of buyers and sellers in the industry.110 Furthermore, the risks
arising from exclusive contracts increase depending on how long the
contract will last, the sources contracted with, and other available al-
ternatives.111 In United States v. Microsoft Corp., the court recognized
that Microsoft held exclusive dealings with “fourteen of the top fifteen
access providers in North America,” which represented “a large ma-
jority of all Internet access subscriptions in this part of the world.”112
The court, therefore, concluded the exclusive dealings were unfair
practices.113
The second type of improper conduct is tying the sale of two prod-
ucts.114 Although there are advantages to offering two products in a
package deal, monopolists that force buyers to purchase both prod-
ucts can invade previously un-entered markets and threaten those
markets’ competition.115 Moreover, tying two products together may
force consumers to buy a product that they did not need or want to
buy.116 In Microsoft Corp., the court suggested that Microsoft engaged










112. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70–71 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
113. Id. at 71.
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pre-installed browsing software (Internet Explorer), effectively re-
stricting Windows’s buyers from uninstalling the browsing software
should they desire.117 The effect on competition was that competitors
could not use the lowest-cost means to challenge Microsoft’s market
share.118
The third type of improper conduct is predatory or below-cost pric-
ing.119 Although low costs rarely harm consumers, sometimes they
can.120 Monopolists use low, sub-cost prices to kick competitors out of
the market and then raise prices over market level afterward, which
harms the consumer.121 The court in Microsoft Corp. noted that
Microsoft allegedly priced its Internet Explorer browsing software at
below-cost in a deliberate scheme to maintain profits in selling its
Windows operating system.122
Lastly, refusing to deal is improper conduct.123 While this issue’s
jurisprudence is evolving, courts focus on how monopolies use refusal
to deal to maintain or expand their reach.124 It is likely improper for a
company to refuse dealings with any supplier or customer that may
threaten to deal with the company’s rivals.125 Even so, refusal to deal
remains an unsettled area of law because businesses generally have no
obligation to deal with their competitors, so forcing them to make a
deal to avoid violating antitrust laws can seem counterproductive.126
But if a company has market power, a court might still find that refus-
ing to do business is improper.127
Even if a company participates in improper conduct, a business jus-
tification may relieve the company of liability under the antitrust
laws.128 Courts favorably view companies that gain their monopoly
power through good business decisions rather than the unfair prac-
tices discussed above.129 If power was gained solely through good bus-
iness decisions, a company does not violate antitrust laws, even if it
has monopoly power in its industry.130
117. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 95–96.
118. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.





122. But the lower court did not assign liability for predatory pricing, and the plain-
tiffs did not pursue the issue on appeal. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 68.







128. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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2. Applying the Test to the Corn Seed Industry Today
The corn seed industry is subject to the same two-prong test de-
tailed above.131 This Comment accordingly explores the companies in
the corn seed industry, including their market shares and potentially
unfair practices.132
a. Who Are the Players?
As of 2015, before any merger discussions between Dow and Du-
Pont and between Bayer and Monsanto, five major companies con-
trolled the industry: Monsanto with a 36.7% market share; DuPont,
34.6%; AgReliant, 7.1%; Dow AgroSciences, 6.1%; and Syngenta,
5.0%.133 Various smaller companies controlled the remaining
10.5%.134 While Bayer was participating in the seed industry at this
point, the company’s focus was on cottonseed, not corn seed.135
Therefore, Bayer did not control any portion of the corn seed industry
in 2015.136
CORN SEED COMPANIES’ MARKET SHARES
(2015)
131. See supra notes 77–130 and accompanying text.
132. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
133. Sonja Begemann, Farm Journal: Mergers and Market Shifts, VERDANT PART-
NERS (July 23, 2016), https://www.verdantpartners.com/post/farm-journal-mergers-
and-market-shifts [https://perma.cc/4QDU-4ETA] [hereinafter Mergers and Market
Shifts].
134. Id.
135. See Sonja Begemann, Farm Journal: What to Watch as Mergers Near the Finish
Line, VERDANT PARTNERS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.verdantpartners.com/post/
farm-journal-what-to-watch-as-mergers-near-the-finish-line [https://perma.cc/UXZ6-
N7TR].
136. See Mergers and Market Shifts, supra note 133.
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However, two notable mergers changed the corn seed industry’s
market structure, as Monsanto merged with Bayer to become
Bayer,137 and DuPont merged with Dow to become DowDuPont.138
The Dow-DuPont merger finalized in 2017,139 while the Monsanto-
Bayer merger finalized in 2018.140 In 2019, Monsanto-Bayer (now
Bayer) and Dow-DuPont (now DowDuPont) controlled 37% and
36% of the corn seed market share, respectively.141
b. Does a Corn Seed Company Have Monopoly Power?
After one determines the market share of the companies in the corn
seed industry, one can analyze if any company has monopoly
power.142 While Bayer’s and DowDuPont’s market shares are both
significant,143 it is unlikely that either company has monopoly power.
Neither company’s market share exceeds 50%,144 the threshold courts
tend to require.145 Because analyzing the industry for a monopoly to-
day would likely fail under the first prong, analyzing the second prong
would be unnecessary.146 However, assuming that these companies
had monopoly power, they may exhibit some practices that would
constitute improper conduct, which this Comment now discusses.
IV. IS A MONOPOLY FORMING IN THE CORN SEED INDUSTRY?
As explained above, few large and dominant companies currently
control the corn seed industry,147 and their market shares have contin-
ually increased throughout the years.148 In 2015, four companies,
Monsanto, DuPont, Dow, and Syngenta, controlled about 85% of the
corn seed industry,149 rising from 50.5% in 1988.150
137. See generally Bayer Plans Closing of Monsanto Acquisition on June 7, BAYER
(June 4, 2018), https://media.bayer.com/baynews/baynews.nsf/id/Bayer-plans-closing-
of-Monsanto-acquisition-on-June-7 [https://perma.cc/RSY8-TUDN].




140. Bayer Plans Closing of Monsanto Acquisition on June 7, supra note 137.
141. Stephen D. Simpson, Why Is Monsanto Evil, but DuPont Isn’t?, INVES-
TOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/061913/why-monsanto-evil-
dupont-isnt.asp (Aug. 14, 2019) [https://perma.cc/US3N-E4LU].
142. Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
143. See Simpson, supra note 141.
144. Id.
145. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
146. See id.
147. See supra notes 133–41 and accompanying text.
148. Zoe Willingham & Andy Green, A Fair Deal for Farmers: Raising Earnings
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But with the recent mergers, one might wonder who is truly starting
to form a monopoly in the industry—the answer: Bayer. Even though
Bayer and DowDuPont have nearly identical market shares of 37%
and 36%, respectively, what makes Bayer the company with the grow-
ing monopoly?151 Continuous market-share growth and the use of un-
fair practices make Bayer a likely future candidate for holding a
monopoly.152
A. Passing the Two-Prong Test in the Future
1. Will Bayer Have Monopoly Power in the Future?
A Bayer monopoly could only exist if Bayer obtained monopoly
power in the industry.153 Monsanto’s (now Bayer’s) market share has
generally increased over the years.154 Alternatively, DuPont’s (now
DowDuPont’s) market share has steadily decreased.155 Monsanto’s,
DuPont’s, and Dow’s market shares from 2011 to 2015,156 before
merger talks began, are shown below:
MONSANTO’S, DUPONT’S & DOW’S CORN SEED MARKET SHARES
(2011–2015)
Bayer’s market share will likely continue growing for two rea-
sons.157 First, Bayer has increased its market share through mergers
and acquisitions with other companies and, second, Bayer is obtaining
patents, which are increasingly popular in the corn seed industry.158
151. Simpson, supra note 141.
152. See Mergers and Market Shifts, supra note 133; Hubbard, supra note 1; Wen
Zhou, The Patent Landscape of Genetically Modified Organisms, HARV. UNIV.: SCI.
IN THE NEWS (Aug. 10, 2015), http://sitn.hms.harvard.edu/flash/2015/the-patent-land-
scape-of-genetically-modified-organisms/ [https://perma.cc/R7S4-YNSM].
153. See supra notes 82–104 and accompanying text.
154. Mergers and Market Shifts, supra note 133.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Hubbard, supra note 1; Zhou, supra note 152.
158. Hubbard, supra note 1; Zhou, supra note 152.
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Bayer is likely to continue using these tools and, therefore, continue
receiving more monopoly power in the future.
a. Mergers and Acquisitions
The first way Bayer may gain monopoly power in the corn seed
industry is through mergers and acquisitions.159 The popularity of
mergers and acquisitions in the corn seed industry relates to patents
and economies of scale.160 Companies often combine to gain control
over products that one company has exclusive control of through pat-
ents,161 and enlarging through mergers and acquisitions facilitates
economies of scale, discussed in greater detail below.162 For now, it is
important to note that these factors have made mergers and acquisi-
tions very popular in the corn seed industry.163 As a result, Bayer has
used them and will likely continue using them in the future.164
Monsanto (before the Bayer-Monsanto merger) acquired approxi-
mately 100 seed companies from 1996 to 2018, and Bayer acquired
about fifty during the same period, for a total of approximately 150
seed companies for the newly combined company, Bayer.165 However,
DowDuPont acquired significantly less companies during this time,
with a combined total of about fifty-three companies.166 If this trend
continues, combined with other factors such as patents, Bayer is likely
to reach an even-larger portion of the market than DowDuPont, and
therefore could reach the monopoly-power threshold.167
b. Patents
Patents are another way Bayer might obtain monopoly power in the
corn seed industry.168 Currently, corn seed companies can receive pat-
ents for any new genetically modified organism (“GMO”),169 which
“is a plant . . . whose genetic makeup has been modified in a labora-
tory using genetic engineering or transgenic technology.”170 Farmers
use GMOs as an alternative to pesticides to reduce plant-harming
159. See Mergers, supra note 94.
160. See Aleksandre Maisashvili et al., Seed Prices, Proposed Mergers and Acquisi-






164. Hubbard, supra note 1.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id.; Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
168. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
169. Zhou, supra note 152.
170. What Is a GMO?, NON-GMO PROJECT, https://www.nongmoproject.org/gmo-
facts/what-is-gmo/ [https://perma.cc/45L2-4UJ7].
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pests.171 Because inventing a new GMO costs roughly $136 million,
companies need incentives, such as profits and exclusivity, to develop
them.172 Thus, companies patent their GMOs to obtain exclusive use
of the product.173
Although GMOs can benefit the farmer, patenting GMOs can hurt
the industry as a whole because of the monopoly that it often cre-
ates.174 Patents concentrate business power, increase costs, obstruct
research, and disrupt seed exchange between farmers.175
As of 2009, some of the largest companies in the industry, including
Monsanto, Bayer, and DuPont, had filed for 532 patents.176 Moreover,
the patent’s popularity in the corn seed industry has only increased.177
In 2013, Monsanto (now Bayer) owned “1,676 seed, plant and other
applicable patents,”178 and has since patented Roundup-tolerant corn
and a GMO corn.179 Roughly 80% of genetically modified corn
planted in the United States is Monsanto’s, suggesting that Bayer has
a huge advantage in the corn seed industry by controlling this product
through patents.180 By comparison, in 2015, Dow and DuPont had a
combined total of approximately 1,314 patents.181 Because Monsanto
(now Bayer) has more patents, it likely has greater control over more
products, which could lead to increased market share in the
industry.182
Because Bayer has participated in an increasing number of mergers
and acquisitions and continues to receive patents on corn seeds,183
Bayer’s market share will likely increase in the coming years, allowing
the company to obtain monopoly power in the industry.184
171. Virginia Gewin, Genetically Modified Corn—Environmental Benefits and
Risks, 1 PLOS BIOLOGY 15, 15–16 (2003), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.
0000008.
172. Zhou, supra note 152.
173. Id.
174. Monopoly Patents & GMOs: Bad News for Farmers, ORGANIC CONSUMERS




177. See U.S. and Monsanto Dominate Global Market for GM Seeds, ORGANIC
CONSUMERS ASS’N (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.organicconsumers.org/essays/us-and-
monsanto-dominate-global-market-gm-seeds [https://perma.cc/YJ4P-BRV5].
178. Id.
179. Zhou, supra note 152.
180. U.S. and Monsanto Dominate Global Market for GM Seeds, supra note 177.
181. Steve Brachmann, Merger of Dow and DuPont Set to Make Huge Waves in
Agriculture, Materials and Plastics Sectors, IP WATCHDOG (Dec. 14, 2015), https://
www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/12/14/dowdupont-merger/id=63849/ [https://perma.cc/
W34T-DZG3].
182. See id.; U.S. and Monsanto Dominate Global Market for GM Seeds, supra note
177; Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
183. Hubbard, supra note 1; U.S. and Monsanto Dominate Global Market for GM
Seeds, supra note 177.
184. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
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2. Does Bayer Participate in Unfair Practices?
A company with monopoly power is only liable under the antitrust
laws if the company participated in unfair practices, as courts will not
punish a company for having a solid business strategy.185 Bayer’s po-
tentially unfair practices include exclusive supply agreements, tying
the sale of two products, and the refusal to deal.186
Monsanto (now Bayer) has made many efforts to ensure its custom-
ers exclusively use its products.187 The company has filed nearly 1,000
suits against farmers, although it settled most of these suits out of
court.188 Many suits targeted farmers who allegedly violated licensing
agreements to use Monsanto seed or who had unknowingly used
Monsanto’s GMOs.189 Pursuing these unknown infringements made it
nearly impossible for many farmers to grow the crops they desired, as
farmers almost exclusively had to use Monsanto’s products to avoid
liability.190 Similarly, in Microsoft Corp., the court ruled that exclusive
supply agreements were evidence of unfair practices when Microsoft
had exclusive dealings with most access providers in its respective in-
dustry, meaning the consumers could only use Microsoft’s products.191
Therefore, a court could also conclude that steps to limit the use of
other corn seed products by Bayer are exclusive dealings, and thus
unfair practices.192
Similarly, Monsanto (now Bayer) has used “tying the sale” tactics
involving its Roundup Ready herbicide and crop products.193 Because
farmers spray Roundup herbicide to prevent weed growth, they also
need Roundup Ready crops, which are unaffected by the herbicide.194
As a result of tying Monsanto products by making consumers buy
Roundup herbicide with, for example, Roundup Ready corn seed to
use the products successfully, the company grew substantially, as
Monsanto’s revenue doubled.195 Likewise, in Microsoft Corp., the
court suggested that tying the web browser with the operating system
185. Id.
186. See Exclusive Supply or Purchase Agreements, supra note 108; Tying the Sale
of Two Products, supra note 114; Refusal to Deal, supra note 123.
187. Valerie Reynoso, The Rising Monopoly of Monsanto-Bayer, COUNTERPUNCH





191. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 71–72 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
192. See Exclusive Supply or Purchase Agreements, supra note 108; Reynoso, supra
note 187.
193. Reynoso, supra note 187; see generally Tying the Sale of Two Products, supra
note 114.
194. Maggie Delano, About Roundup Ready Crops, ROUNDUP READY CROPS
(2009), https://web.mit.edu/demoscience/Monsanto/about.html [https://perma.cc/
KFP2-FNMK].
195. Reynoso, supra note 187.
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evidenced unfair practices.196 Therefore, a court could also determine
that Bayer tying the corn seed and Roundup together is an unfair
practice.197
Finally, the DOJ has investigated Monsanto (now Bayer) for anti-
competitive practices that could factor into a refusal to deal analy-
sis.198 Although the refusal to deal doctrine is evolving, Monsanto has
implicated the doctrine through using potentially exploitative prac-
tices relating to its patents on soybean, cotton, and transgenic corn.199
Although courts are not clear on the exact standard for refusal to deal,
Monsanto’s limiting competition could likely factor into the
analysis.200
Monsanto’s (now Bayer’s) practices unlikely trigger a fourth factor
in the analysis, namely predatory or below-cost pricing,201 which has
been a non-issue in the corn seed industry.202 In fact, farmers continue
buying Monsanto’s seeds despite pricing complaints.203 Even so,
Bayer’s other practices—exclusive supply agreements, tying the sale
of two products, and refusal to deal—would likely be enough for the
court to treat the company as a monopoly, with the condition that
Bayer obtains 50% of the market share.204
B. Impacts of the Growing Monopoly in the Corn Seed Industry
Because Bayer is likely to form a monopoly in the corn seed indus-
try, it is important to consider both the advantages and disadvantages
this poses from the monopolist’s (Bayer’s) and the consumer’s per-
spectives. Here, the most significant benefit is for Bayer, as it can
achieve economies of scale.205 However, many negatives could result,
including raised prices and decreased research and development.206
196. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 95–96 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam).
197. See Tying the Sale of Two Products, supra note 114; Reynoso, supra note 187.
198. Reynoso, supra note 187; see generally Refusal to Deal, supra note 123.
199. Reynoso, supra note 187.
200. See id.; Refusal to Deal, supra note 123.
201. See generally Predatory or Below-Cost Pricing, supra note 119.
202. See Sonja Begemann, Seed Price Triples over Last 20 Years, FARM J. AGWEB
(July 20, 2017, 5:12 PM), https://www.agweb.com/article/seed-price-triples-over-last-
20-years-NAA-sonja-begemann [https://perma.cc/EQ96-A9EQ].
203. The Planet Versus Monsanto, FORBES (Dec. 31, 2009, 4:40 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/forbes/2010/0118/americas-best-company-10-gmos-dupont-planet-
versus-monsanto.html#329f39810dc8 [https://perma.cc/UE6U-YQ8T].
204. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
205. Monopoly and Market Power, BODY OF KNOWLEDGE ON INFRASTRUCTURE
REGUL., http://regulationbodyofknowledge.org/market-structure-and-competition/mo
nopoly-market-power/ [https://perma.cc/KN26-9L2F].
206. See id.; Willingham & Green, supra note 148.
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1. Advantages
The most significant advantage to monopolization is achieving
economies of scale.207 Economies of scale benefit the monopolist, as
they “imply that the firm’s average cost declines as the firm increases
output.”208 As mentioned above, mergers and acquisitions facilitate
economies of scale because combining allows companies to become
larger, thus decreasing costs.209
Here, economies of scale are particularly advantageous for Bayer
because developing a genetically modified crop is expensive.210 The
business-development cost for genetically modifying a plant is typi-
cally around $136 million,211 which may be too expensive for smaller
companies.212 But larger companies with economies of scale, which
Bayer continues to obtain as it increases its monopoly power, may
have the ability to make this investment to produce a new genetically
modified plant.213
Some benefits that farmers gain from growing genetically modified
crops include “lower production costs, fewer pest problems, reduced
use of pesticides, and better yields.”214 If companies did not have
economies of scale, farmers might not be able to reap these benefits
because of less genetically modified plants.
2. Disadvantages
A negative impact for farmers is raised prices, as farmers expect
mergers and acquisitions to increase corn seed prices by 2.3%.215 This
equals an average increase of $1,000 for farmers each year.216 Follow-
ing fertilizer, corn seed is already the second-highest operating cost
for farmers, indicating an increase in this cost could very negatively
impact American farmers.217
A monopoly would also inhibit research and development
(“R&D”), seed options, and overall innovation.218 The combined
R&D budget for the new company Bayer is lower than the combined
207. See Monopoly and Market Power, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. Maisashvili et al., supra note 160, at 3.





213. See id.; Monopoly and Market Power, supra note 205.
214. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Genetically Engineered Crops Benefit Many Farmers, but
the Technology Needs Proper Management to Remain Effective, Report Suggests, SCI.
DAILY (Apr. 22, 2010), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/04/100413112058.
htm [https://perma.cc/LE8R-TEX9].
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R&D total for both companies separately.219 In 2017, the year before
Bayer-Monsanto finalized the merger, Monsanto had an R&D budget
of $1,607,000,220 while Bayer’s R&D budget for crop science was
$1,166,000,221 for a combined total of $2,773,000. However, after the
2018 merger, the R&D budget was $1,950,000,222 significantly less
than the previous year’s combined total. Furthermore, as mergers, ac-
quisitions, and market concentration continue to accelerate in the
seed industry, R&D also decreases.223 Lastly, as consolidation in the
corn seed industry occurs, farmers lose choices when purchasing corn
seeds.224 As a result, the farmers’ choices regarding corn seed will
likely decrease as Bayer’s monopoly power increases.225
V. THE GOVERNMENT’S REGULATION OF THE CORN SEED
MONOPOLY
Many individuals have encouraged the government to regulate the
corn seed industry.226 However, as explained above, it is not time for
government action. A discussion about the actions stakeholders are
taking, and how the government is likely to respond to a Bayer mo-
nopoly when appropriate, is below.
A. What Actions Are Stakeholders in the Corn Seed Industry
Currently Taking to Prompt Regulation?
Farmers, industry experts, farm organizations, and even political al-
lies in the corn seed industry are opposing Bayer’s potential power
grab.227 Farmers are filing lawsuits against Bayer, organizations have
publicly stated their opposition to the mergers in the industry, and
lawmakers recently considered legislation that would place a morato-
rium on mergers in the agriculture industry.228
219. Compare MONSANTO, SHARING VALUE, SUSTAINING INNOVATION: 2017 AN-
NUAL REPORT 8, https://monsanto.com/app/uploads/2017/12/2017_Monsanto_Annual
_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF4J-LZSE] [hereinafter MONSANTO 2017 REPORT],
and BAYER, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 63 [hereinafter BAYER 2017 REPORT], with
BAYER, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT ch. B 4/2 [hereinafter BAYER 2018 REPORT].
220. MONSANTO 2017 REPORT, supra note 219, at 8.
221. BAYER 2017 REPORT, supra note 219, at 63.
222. BAYER 2018 REPORT, supra note 219, at ch. B 4/2.
223. Willingham & Green, supra note 148.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Jacob Bunge, Bayer, BASF Ordered to Pay $265 Million in Weedkiller
Crop-Damage Suit, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-basf-ordered-to-
pay-265-million-in-weedkiller-crop-damage-suit-11581795711 (Feb. 15, 2020, 5:38 PM)
[https://perma.cc/2KFE-5LZF]; Hubbard, supra note 1; Farmers Overwhelmingly Op-
pose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1; Food and Agribusiness Merger Morato-
rium and Antitrust Review Act of 2018, H.R. 6800, 115th Cong. (2018).
227. See Bunge, supra note 226; Hubbard, supra note 1; Farmers Overwhelmingly
Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1; H.R. 6800.
228. See Bunge, supra note 226, Hubbard, supra note 1; Farmers Overwhelmingly
Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1; H.R. 6800.
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Farmer Bill Bader sued Bayer after claiming that the company en-
couraged farmers to spray its uncontrollable weed killer, causing dam-
age to his fruit trees.229 The jury awarded Bader $265 million.230
Attorneys are hopeful that the positive verdict in the Bader case will
encourage others to sue Bayer.231 As of October 2019, more than
42,000 plaintiffs joined a lawsuit against Bayer claiming that the com-
pany’s Roundup product caused cancer.232 They argue that the com-
pany failed to warn them of the product’s cancer risk.233
Second, farm organizations are advocating against mergers,234 with
forty-five different organizations having rallied against the then-pro-
posed Bayer-Monsanto merger.235 Farm Aid, National Farmers
Union,236 Organization for Competitive Markets,237 Organic Seed Al-
liance,238 SumOfUs,239 and Friends of the Earth240 are all organiza-
tions that are helping support farmers.241 Roger Johnson, the
president of National Farmers Union, stated: “Family farmers deserve
fair prices, choices in what they plant, and the type of market competi-
tion that incentivizes firms to compete and innovate for their business.
A Bayer-Monsanto merger stands to move each of these factors in the
wrong direction, and that is away from competitive markets.”242 These
organizations will likely continue supporting farmers by opposing fu-
ture industry consolidation.243
229. Bunge, supra note 226.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Roundup Weedkiller: 42,000 Plaintiffs Sue Bayer over Glyphosate, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.dw.com/en/roundup-weedkiller-42000-plaintiffs-
sue-bayer-over-glyphosate/a-51043520 [https://perma.cc/B8L9-QHV6].
233. Id.
234. Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1.
235. Id.
236. “[National Farmers Union] has always worked to protect and enhance the eco-
nomic well-being and quality of life for family farmers, fishers, ranchers and rural
communities . . . .” About NFU, NAT’L FARMERS UNION, https://nfu.org/about/ [https:/
/perma.cc/QBR6-HSQE].
237. “Organization for Competitive Markets . . . is a membership-based research
and advocacy organization working to expose and break the stranglehold of corporate
consolidation in our food and agricultural economy.” About OCM, ORG. FOR COM-
PETITIVE MKTs., https://competitivemarkets.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/PK79-
X44R].
238. “Organic Seed Alliance advances ethical seed solutions to meet food and
farming needs in a changing world.” Our Story, ORGANIC SEED ALL., https://seedal-
liance.org/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/7SVH-BAYR].
239. “SumOfUs is a community of people from around the world committed to
curbing the growing power of corporations.” About Us, SUMOFUS, https://
www.sumofus.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/D6ZP-M3F7].
240. “Friends of the Earth strives for a more healthy and just world.” About Us,
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, https://foe.org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/J7DM-PJMD].
241. Farmers Overwhelmingly Oppose Bayer Monsanto Merger, supra note 1.
242. Id.
243. See id.
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Third, Congress proposed the Food and Agribusiness Merger Mora-
torium and Antitrust Review Act of 2018244 to “impose a moratorium
on large agribusiness, food and beverage manufacturing, and grocery
retail mergers, and to establish a commission to review large agricul-
ture, food and beverage manufacturing, and grocery retail mergers,
concentration, and market power.”245 While Congress has made no
further progress on this law, merely introducing it reflects political
concern about the consolidation in the corn seed industry.246
B. Will and Should the Government Regulate the Corn Seed
Monopoly?
The government likely will, and should, act regarding the monopoly
forming in the corn seed industry, as “[a]ggressive competition among
sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers – both individuals and
businesses – the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and
services, more choices, and greater innovation.”247 These benefits are
powerful and important considerations for consumers, who predomi-
nantly care about low prices, selection variety, and quality products
and services.248
However, as explained above, it is not time for the government to
interfere in the corn seed industry because Bayer is unlikely violating
the antitrust laws today due to a lack of monopoly power.249 But the
government will likely act, specifically when Bayer’s market share ex-
ceeds 50%.250 The government has two regulatory avenues: merger
policy and breaking up the monopoly.251 This Comment discusses
these methods in greater detail below.
244. Food and Agribusiness Merger Moratorium and Antitrust Review Act of 2018,
H.R. 6800, 115th Cong. (2018).
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. Guide to Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-ad-
vice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/Y3XK-EFZS].
248. FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMPETITION COUNTS: HOW CONSUMERS WIN WHEN
BUSINESSES COMPETE 2, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competi-
tion-counts/zgen01.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK67-8UBD].
249. Simpson, supra note 141; see Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
250. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29.
251. See generally Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-anti-
trust-laws/mergers/premerger-notification-merger-review [https://perma.cc/54LC-
SP9L]; Matthew Lane, The Great Antitrust Breakup: Often Threatened, Rarely Exe-
cuted, DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.project-
disco.org/competition/031318-the-great-antitrust-breakup-often-threatened-rarely-ex-
ecuted/ [https://perma.cc/J9Z7-6EX9].
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1. Merger Policy
The government’s merger policy would apply when a company ob-
tained monopoly power through a merger.252 Because the government
wants to prevent any mergers disallowed under antitrust laws, it re-
quires a premerger notification.253 Businesses attempting to merge or
acquire must file this notification and then wait for government re-
view and authorization before proceeding.254 When determining
whether a merger is allowed under the antitrust laws, “[t]he key ques-
tion the agency asks is whether the proposed merger is likely to create
or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.”255
The DOJ’s past decisions to approve mergers in the corn seed in-
dustry do not necessarily forecast the future.256 When the DOJ ap-
proved the Bayer-Monsanto merger, it included the condition that the
“merging parties divest holdings in narrowly drawn input markets in
which they directly competed.”257 In the Competitive Impact State-
ment that the United States filed against Bayer-Monsanto, the gov-
ernment stated:
Bayer and Monsanto are close competitors in the GM seeds and
traits markets for three important U.S. row crops: cotton, canola,
and soybeans. . . . [T]he proposed merger would likely lead to a
substantial lessening of competition in each of these markets, result-
ing in hundreds of millions of dollars in harm each year to Ameri-
can farmers and consumers.258
Therefore, the divesting259 was not for every product that Bayer-Mon-
santo sold, just in the industries it held too much market power: cot-
ton, canola, and soybeans.260 The DOJ’s action shows that the
government is aware of Bayer’s growing power.261 This means if
Bayer’s market share reaches 50% in the corn seed industry due to a
merger, the DOJ will likely take steps to interfere by forcing the com-
pany to divest holdings that would create a market share under 50%
for corn seed.262
252. See Premerger Notification and the Merger Review Process, supra note 251.
253. See id.
254. Id.
255. Mergers, supra note 94.
256. See Willingham & Green, supra note 148.
257. Id.
258. Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v.
Bayer AG, 83 Fed. Reg. 27,670, 27,671 (June 13, 2018).
259. Divesting means that Bayer-Monsanto had to reduce the assets it held in the
corn seed industry. See Akhilesh Ganti, Divestment, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/d/divestment.asp (Nov. 2, 2020) [https://perma.cc/S8V8-
2CF8].
260. Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, 83 Fed. Reg. at
27,674.
261. See id.
262. See Monopolization Defined, supra note 29; Willingham & Green, supra note
148.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 26 28-APR-21 10:51
658 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8
2. Breaking Up a Monopoly
The government breaks up a monopoly when a company obtains
monopoly power by means other than mergers, such as patents.263
However, the government rarely elects this option, as breaking up a
monopoly can negatively impact innovation and company effi-
ciency.264 And just the threat of breaking up a company may be
enough to incentivize good behavior.265 But in the limited circum-
stances where the government has exercised this option, the govern-
ment could readily discern how to split the company into component
parts or subsidiaries.266 Discerning the proper split becomes difficult
after companies consolidate activities through a merger.267
Because Bayer and Monsanto already merged, a government
breakup is problematic. But to the extent the government could iden-
tify a proper split, this option remains on the table if it cannot success-
fully implement another remedy to combat the monopoly power.
VI. CONCLUSION
Corn seed is an integral part of society for agricultural, cultural, and
practical purposes. Thus, mergers of significant corn seed companies
have caught the eye of many organizations and farmers alike. Some
have called for the DOJ to enforce the antitrust laws against Bayer, as
it seems to be taking over the corn seed industry. Yet, a close exami-
nation reveals that, despite the company’s growth, a monopoly is not
present today.
Courts will not find a company liable under the antitrust laws unless
the company has monopoly power. Despite holding a large portion of
the corn seed industry’s market share, Bayer has not reached the req-
uisite threshold. Therefore, it is not time for the government to pursue
Bayer for holding a monopoly.
Even so, evidence indicates that in the future Bayer will hold this
power. Bayer’s market share has continually increased, and this mo-
nopoly power will likely increase through Bayer’s many mergers, ac-
quisitions, and patents. Bayer’s business practices are also likely
unfair, the second requirement for courts to determine a monopoly
exists. These include exclusive purchase contracts, tying the sale of
two products, and the refusal to deal. Collectively, Bayer’s unfair
practices and monopoly power would likely allow the DOJ to pursue
Bayer under the antitrust laws.
When Bayer gains the required market share, the two ways that the
government could regulate the corn seed industry is through the U.S.





\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\8-3\TWL304.txt unknown Seq: 27 28-APR-21 10:51
2021] GROWING MONOPOLY IN CORN SEED INDUSTRY 659
merger policy or through breaking up the monopoly. As past decisions
indicate, the government will likely use the merger policy. However,
breaking up the monopoly remains an option, provided a court could
determine how to split Bayer into component parts or subsidiaries.
In conclusion, the government will likely regulate Bayer’s corn seed
monopoly when Bayer reaches 50% of the market share in the corn
seed industry. When the government regulates, it will likely be suc-
cessful because of the evidence that Bayer has used unfair practices.
Until then, Bayer does not hold monopoly power in the corn seed
industry, and thus, it is not time for the government to regulate.
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